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This paper focuses on the experiences of disabled people in the UK assigned to the 
Employment and Support Allowance Work Related Activity Group. Specifically, it 
considers the impact of processes of conditionality and sanctions on this group.  The 
research was designed, conducted and analysed collaboratively between a disabled 
people’s user-led organisation (DPULO) and an academic team.  The research 
documents the negative impact that processes of conditionality and sanctions had 
upon participants. The results highlighted 3 main themes: a lack of equality between 
disabled claimants and other claimants; significant impact of issues of compliance 
within a regime that imposes conditions and sanctions; and alternative ways of 
experiencing and responding to this policy regime. Suggestions are made as to how 
to involve disabled people in decision-making at policy level to ensure that such 
conditionality and sanctioning are not used when there is clear evidence that 
highlights the damaging and detrimental effects of these processes.  
 
Keywords  




In 2017 the UK Government stated that it was their ambition to halve the ‘disability 
employment gap - the difference between the employment rates of disabled and 
non-disabled people,’ (Department for Work and Pension [DWP] and Department for 
Health [DoH], 2017). Furthermore they asserted an ambition to increase the number 
of disabled people in work by one million by 2027 (DWP and DoH, 2017). It is in this 
context that current welfare reform policies in the UK are being implemented.  
 
In terms of the wider disability context, in 2015/2016 an estimated 2.5 million 
people in the U.K. were in receipt of out of work disability benefits, costing 
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approximately £14.7 billion (Kennedy, Murphy and Wilson,2016), (from 2008 
onwards, disability benefit in the UK was labelled Employment Support Allowance - 
ESA). For those in receipt of ESA, approximately 18% (429,000) were assessed and 
placed in the Work-Related Activity Group (WRAG), (Kennedy, et al. 2017).  The 
WRAG  is based on the assumption that people have the capacity to undertake paid 
work or work-related activity and they are deemed to have “limited capacity for 
work” and must adhere to such acitivities in order to receive their benefits.  If people 
are found to have a “limited capacity for work-related activity”, then they are placed 
in the ESA Support Group and are not required to take part in mandatory job 
searches or work training activities in order to continue to receive their benefit. They 
are judged “unlikely to ever be able to work on grounds of sickness or disability,” 
(Houston and Lindsay, 2010, 135).  
These types of conditional processes are part of a wider push towards activation-
based modes of welfare reform (Pascual and Magnusson, 2007), whereby an 
emphasis is placed on a benefits system regime which requires claimants to 
demonstrate they are actively seeking employment.  
 
Of the 429,000 people on ESA, just under 50% of them received benefits due to an 
assessment of ‘mental and behavioural disorders’ (Kennedy et al., 2017). The UK 
Welfare Reform Act (2016) legislated that any new ESA claimants who were placed 
in the WRAG would receive the same amount of money as those claiming Job 
Seekers Allowance (JSA), (HM Treasury, 2015). In real terms, this re-categorisation of 
payments marked a decrease, on average of approximately £28.05 per week, (HM 
Treasury, 2015) for all new and returning claimants allocated to the WRAG.  
 
This policy of alignment functioned to decrease the levels of WRAG payments, rather 
than increase levels of JSA payments. The implication was that disabled people did 
not incur any extra living costs compared to people claiming JSA. Furthermore, this 
decrease was supported through claims that the legislation was designed to 
‘…remove the financial incentives that could otherwise discourage claimants from 
taking steps back to work’ (DWP, 2011).  
 
The reduction of WRAG payments marks a change to a long-standing feature of 
welfare legislation that placed benefits for disabled people at higher rates than those 
who were unemployed (Fletcher and Wright, 2018). The combination of policy 
priorities and reforms place disabled people in the frontline of a government policy 
agenda to reduce the overall welfare bill by getting more (disabled) people back into 
employment. This approach is not out of step with other international 
developments, where there are clear efforts to shift people from incapacity benefit 
onto other, more time limited forms of support (Pascual and Magnusson, 2007). In 
this paper we set out the UK context of these reforms, consider how they have been 
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legitimised and then demonstrate, through empirical examples, the impact of these 
reforms on disabled people. We conclude by offering an alternative way forward for 
disabled peoples’ welfare in the UK, paying particular attention to the implications of 
the rollout of Universal Credit. 
 
Activation-based welfare 
Since 2003, there have been fundamental changes in how welfare benefit is 
allocated and processed in the UK. In 2003, 7% of the working age population in the 
UK were in receipt of some form of incapacity benefit (Houston and Lindsay, 2010).  
This number has remained relatively constant despite ongoing reductions in the 
numbers of people claiming unemployment benefit. In 2008 a range of existing 
benefits (such as Incapacity Benefit, Income Support and Severe Disablement 
Allowance) were all replaced by ESA.  
 
Following the 2012 Welfare Reform Act, (DWP, 2012), all claimants were required to 
undergo mandatory reassessment and many people with long-term health problems 
and impairments were transferred onto ESA. After assessment, claimants were 
placed into one of two groups: the Work-Related Activity Group (WRAG) or the 
Support Group (DWP, 2012).  
 
People in the WRAG category are deemed suitable for some work-related activity 
and are; “required to attend work-focused interviews and undertake “work-related 
activity”, such as work experience, training or participating in the Work Programme, 
(DWP, 2018). People placed into the Support Group are not expected to undertake 
work-related activity, but are entitled to do so if they wish. For those in the WRAG, 
failure to engage in work-related activity can lead to their ESA payments being cut or 
sanctioned. This sanction can involve losing up to 100% of their ESA payment if the 
mandatory work-related activity is not completed to the satisfaction of the Job 
Centre Plus worker. In effect, this means that welfare payments are now conditional 
on the claimant being seen to be compliant with the requirements of the ESA 
programme. In turn, this demonstrates the full implementation of an activation-
based welfare system in the UK. Central to this shift to an activity-based model are 
processes of compliance.  
 
Compliance and activation-based welfare 
This paper considers the implications of behavioural compliance and activation in 
relation to disabled people in the UKclaiming support from the state. Behavioural 
activation and conditionality, enforced by the imposition or threat of sanctions, mark 
a shift, whereby benefit payments have become more about transactions than 
rights. This moves away from citizens drawing on a public fund of social security to 
manage illness towards treating people as individual claimants who have to provide 
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varying forms of labour in exchange for benefits (Grover and Piggott, 2015.. This has 
been described as a shift from the right to welfare towards the obligations of 
workfare (Wacquant, 2009, 43). It has been argued that these processes shift the 
responsibility away from the state to its individual citizens (Dwyer and Wright, 2014).  
 
This shift towards criteria structured on models of behaviour incorporates a number 
of mandatory activities, such as attendance at job fairs, the production of evidence 
of applications / job searches, undertaking mandated training and/or unpaid work 
experience, as well as engaging in activities designed to produce changes towards 
attitudes and feelings in relation to the job market and to oneself. These types of 
programmes have been described as ‘psycho-compulsion’ (Friedli and Stearn, 2015), 
defined as “the imposition of psychological explanations for unemployment, 
together with mandatory activities intended to modify beliefs, attitude, disposition 
or personality” (2015, 42). Examples of psycho-compulsion include the use of 
psychological therapies in Job Centres whereby unemployment can be reframed as a 
form of psychological maladaptation, which is best ameliorated by fixing negative 
cognitions inside the mind of individual claimants (Friedli, 2014; Speed and Taggart, 
2012). 
 
In line with previous scholarship (see Beresford, 2016; Wright, 2016; Grover, 2017; 
Flintoff, Speed and McPherson, 2018; Stafford et al., 2019), we argue that these 
types of (psycho-compulsion) practices are based on assumptions that many 
disabled people are out of work because of individual attitudes, psychological and/or 
behavioural deficits, rather than as a result of their impairments (which may make it 
impossible for them to work), or social or structural issues such as access barriers to 
employment for disabled people, or general levels of unemployment. This re-
articulation of the relationship between disability and unemployment is 
characteristic of the move to make ESA and JSA equivalent (Pascual and Magnusson, 
2007). Furthermore, there is an underpinning assumption that these individual 
deficits can be rectified through the use of behavioural changes, intended to 
encourage claimants back into employment by removing the perceived benefit for 
disabled peopled to “claim sickness benefits over Job Seekers Allowance,” (Kennedy 
et al., 2017, 16). The government do not deny this behaviour change component in 
the implementation of the policy, but whereas Friedli and Stearn (2015) describe it 
as psycho-compulsion, DWP rhetoric refers to ‘incentives’ (Kennedy et al., 2017).  
 
Much of the evidence base and theoretical justification for the use of these types of 
behavioural incentives in welfare policy for disabled people comes from Behavioural 
Economics research, in particular the Behavioural Insights Team (Dwyer and Wright, 
2014) in the UK. In the next section we will consider these approaches as a 
psychological model of behaviour change that has far reaching impacts on disabled 
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claimants lives.  
 
Theories of behavioural economics and compliance based welfare provision 
There is a growing international interest in behavioural economics, an area drawing 
on insights from psychology and economics. Its main contribution to public policy 
has been to challenge aspects of the economic theory of citizens as rational actors, 
by introducing psychological complexity into human decision-making (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2009). One well-known example of behavioural economics is ‘nudge 
theory’ which has been used to shape policy in a range of areas including, tax 
compliance, smoking cessation and energy use (Leicester, Levell and Rasul, 2012). In 
the area of welfare reform, there is evidence of the theoretical fingerprint with 
much of the DWP literature using terms such as ‘incentives’ and ‘implementation 
intentions’ (such as the Claimant Commitment), both of which are key concepts in 
nudge theory (Behavioural Insights Team, 2015). However the theoretical 
frameworks developed under the heading of behavioural economics are more varied 
than nudge theory and are buffered by empirical evidence, albeit mostly developed 
under controlled experimental conditions (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 for an 
early text).  
 
With particular reference to welfare payments, behavioural economics literature 
offers a range of modelled behaviours to minimise fraudulent claims; these include 
the ‘stigma cost’ of claiming a particular benefit (Moffit, 1983) and using increasingly 
complex application procedures to create an ‘ordeal’ which potentially puts 
claimants off applying (Leicester, Levell and Rasul, 2012). These ‘transaction costs’ 
are intended to increase the difficulty of obtaining and maintaining a welfare claim. 
Granted, the literature does acknowledge that these behaviours can negatively 
effect genuine claimants as well as fraudulent ones, but provides no effective means 
or rationale for how best to distinguish them is proffered (Leicester, Levell and Rasul, 
2012).  
 
The other important factor in considering the applicability of these interventions for 
disabled people is that the empirical basis for the development of sanctioning 
behaviours was based on research conducted on young men at risk of long-term 
unemployment(see Van den berg, Uhlendorff and Wolff, 2013). The sample had no 
reported health conditions, and whilst potential negative side effects were 
highlighted, they were not explored in this research. Given the dominance of 
psychological theory embedded in the development of conditionality and 
sanctioning as a way to influence claimant’s behaviour and psychological 
perspectives, there are real and legitimate concerns about the lack of evidence base 
underpinning the effectiveness of sanctions in relation to disabled people and 
welfare payments (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, 2018), but 
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this has not stopped the application of compliance and conditioning models to 
disabled people.  
 
Ensuring compliance: conditionality and sanctions 
The use of psychological models of behaviour change to influence disabled people’s 
engagement with work-related activity is contingent upon their benefits payments 
being dependent upon their level of compliance with that mandated activity. The 
implementation of a compliance-based system of welfare in the UK is predicated by 
principles of conditionality and sanctions being at the centre of policy and practice 
(Fletcher and Wright, 2018). The rationale and logic is clear, follow the rules and do 
as required and you will continue to receive benefits. Fail to demonstrate you are 
actively looking for work, and risk having your benefit removed.  
 
International evidence shows that the most disadvantaged of claimants, such as 
people with learning difficulties, with low levels of work experience and/or 
education, and the homeless, are all more likely to be sanctioned, (Stafford et al. 
2019; Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2014). As such, far from reducing employment 
inequalities between disabled and non-disabled people, this approach is just as likely 
to exacerbate those inequalities.  For example, according to Geiger et al., (2018) 
there is a lack of joined-up working in relation to the implementation of related 
supportive programmes around rehabilitation or intensive individualized support. 
Similarly, the UK National Audit Office (2016) carried out a preliminary analysis 
which suggested that sanctions have discouraged some ESA claimants from working, 
that is to say, that the government’s own policy was producing a ‘perverse 
incentive’. They concluded that the DWP was not doing enough to use its own data 
to assess both the impact of sanctions on people on benefits and balancing this with 
a detailed analysis of how any savings were impacting public finances.  
 
In terms of the scale of sanctioning, since 2010 over 110,000 benefit sanctions have 
been applied to ESA claimants with a further 140,000 applied but later cancelled 
(Geiger et al., 2018). Whilst this demonstrates that sanctions are clearly a central 
component of UK welfare provision, what this figure does not demonstrate is the 
effect that the threat or fear of sanctioning has upon those people who were 
sanctioned (and this is largely irrespective of whether the sanction was later 
cancelled). The key modus in this regime is the threat of sanction. That is to say, the 
threat that a sanction might be deployed, intentionally or unintentionally, is used to 
ensure compliance with activation-based models of welfare. In this context, the fear 
or threat of sanction becomes a form of psycho-compulsion. Furthermore, it is an 




In terms of the actual sanctioning processes, Marks, Cowan and McLean (2017) 
found that participants placed in the WRAG reported being faced with unrealistic 
demands on their work-related activities, which did not take into account their 
mental health. It appears there was a lack of understanding of the ways in which 
impairments might impact upon a person’s ability to participate in work. For 
example, in terms of the types of work that people in the WRAG might undertake, 
Hale (2014) reported that over 500 out of a total of 550 claimants (over 90%) 
reported that their allocated work-related activity was unsuitable for their assessed 
capabilities, or that it did not meet their needs. Of particular interest was the finding 
that while a small minority (8%) of respondents were actually sanctioned, over 80% 
of that group reported anxiety about being unable to access mandatory activities 
(failure to do so which could result in sanctioning), and 70% of the overall sample 
reported severe anxiety about having sanctions imposed as a consequence (witness 
here the impact of the threat or fear of sanctioning). This suggests that for many 
disabled claimants, the threat of sanctions has a negative impact on their mental 
health irrespective of whether or not they are actually applied. In this context this 
series of welfare reforms might be best characterised as successive attempts, by 
government, to problematise what they see as the perceived benefits of 
unemployment by implementing a system where people are constantly 
impoverished if they are out of work (Grover, 2015). These sorts of developments 
have been described as a drive to recast disabled people as ‘unemployed labour’ 
(Grover and Piggott, 2007), but this government position fails to address wider 
issues of precarity in the UK labour market and the additional, well-documented 
barriers to employment faced by disabled people (Garthwaite, 2011). These 
processes occur within what Grover and Piggott, (2012) describe as ‘a disabling 
employment architecture’ that consistently leads to negative health and economic 
outcomes for disabled people. For example, the WelCond Project (Dwyer et al., 
2018) found that conditionality did little to facilitate transition to employment for 
disabled people and furthermore, that the process negatively impacted upon their 
existing situation and had a detrimental effect on their mental health. It also found 
that the respondents reported that the current welfare system was 
disproportionately focused on sanctions in the absence of any evidence that they 
were effective.  
 
To summarise, there has been a marked shift towards new articulations of 
activation-based models of welfare provision, accompanied by moves to make 
previous forms of incapacity benefit equivalent to unemployment benefit. This has 
been undertaken through the implementation of various forms of psycho-
compulsion, across 3 levels of conditionality, comprised of compliance (e.g. no 
sanction), enforced compliance (e.g. threat of sanction) and non-compliance (e.g. 
actual sanction). These changes have been variously described as a pejorative form 
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of psycho-compulsion, or compliance based system, or in a more positive framing, 
behavioural economics. Given the high proportion of people in the ESA WRAG with 
mental health problems, and given the psychological assumptions about individual 
deficits and the need for individual behaviour change that this model rests upon, we 
argue it is appropriate that a psychologically informed research study is used to 
investigate the extent to which these reforms are offering the right ‘incentives’ in 
encouraging behaviour change, in order to establish its impact upon the mental 
health of disabled people. 
 
Methodology 
The current study was co-conceived, undertaken and disseminated as a 
collaboration between the University of Essex and Inclusion London, a disabled 
people’s user led organisation (DPULO). The current study utilised a similar approach 
to the WelCond project cited above but differed methodologically in one crucial 
respect and that was the ways in which disabled people were involved in all aspects 
of the research process. An inclusive and representative way of conducting research 
is to involve disabled people in the process of “creating, sharing and acting on such 
accounts, rather that regarding them as simply serving as a source of ‘sad stories’ 
and passive accounts of disempowerment and marginalization.” (Beresford, 2016, 
424). What this meant in practical terms was that representatives from the DPULO 
were involved in framing the research question to fit with current priorities, 
analysing the data from a disabled activist as well as academic perspective and in 
disseminating the findings in forums that would maximise research impact. The 
dissemination process will be discussed more in the discussion.  
 
The research utilized in-depth, qualitative semi-structured interviews to explore 
disabled ESA claimant experiences of being placed in the WRAG. The topic guide for 
the semi-structured interviews was co-produced with disabled people through the 
use of a focus group comprised of three members recruited from the DPULO. The 
interviewed participants were asked about their experiences of sanctions and 
conditionality, and about any impact this had upon their job-related activities and 
health and functioning. Fifteen people were recruited into the study, nine male and 
six female with an age range of 29-63 (average age of 42). Thirteen of the 15 
participants were in the WRAG group at the time of interview and two had moved 
out of the WRAG group in the previous four months. In terms of analysing the data, a 
six-stage thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) was used to code, categorise 
and cluster the data into core themes. Thematic codes were initially developed at a 
descriptive level by the lead researcher (JM) and then reviewed and refined by 
research supervisors (DT and EC). The decision to code themes initially at a 
descriptive rather than interpretive level was made to represent the experiences of 
participants as closely as possible to how they described it. The process moved onto 
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a more interpretive theorising of the meaning of themes at the stage of 
dissemination (Patton, 1990) and can be seen below. 
 
Findings: 
The analysis presented here identifies three main themes in terms of how 
participants talked about the impact of the changes in relation to their physical and 
mental health and wellbeing.  The first theme related to a reported lack of 
equivalence between disabled claimants and other claimants. The second theme 
related to questions of compliance. The third theme related to alternative ways of 
experiencing and responding to this policy regime. Each of these themes is 
illustrated and interpreted using numbered interview excerpts from participants. All 
extracts have been anonymised and participant names have been replaced with 
pseudonyms.  
 
Theme 1: Lack of equivalence 
Extract 1 demonstrates some of the perceived negative consequences of aligning 
WRAG payments with JSA payments: 
 
Extract 1 
“The new payments for ESA from this year are £73 a week as opposed to 
£102. Well if you’re on £102 a week because you’ve been on it for longer 
than 6 or 12 months and you know if you go back to work and it turns out 
you’re not well enough to carry on then you’re coming back at the new rate 
of £73 per week. That’s going make you more cautious and its counter-
productive and it increases the stress.” (Daniel).   
 
Here we see clear evidence of a negative impediment to Daniel returning to work, 
resulting in a net £29 reduction in weekly support if his employment does not work 
out. Contra to government insistence that these reforms incentivise work by 
removing perverse incentives (Kennedy et al. ,2017), this data suggests that these 
changes functioned to make entering the labour market appear more risky and 
materially costly for this participant (and that this was particularly salient in the 
context of short-term work). Extract 2 demonstrates a similar failing. 
 
Extract 2 
 “After 13 weeks I have to go and put a new claim in. After 13 weeks if the job 
doesn’t last, or if I get made redundant, or if I get terminated or the contract 
stops, I then have to go into starting all over again. Reassessment etc. So, I’m 




In both these examples, it would appear that there were perverse disincentives to 
returning to work contained within the new ESA procedures. Furthermore, this 
evidence suggests that existing ESA structures actively and negatively contribute to a 
person’s physical and mental health. 
 
Similarly, Dipesh in extract 3 talks about a particular lack of understanding in relation 
to questions of access, and in terms of his emotional wellbeing. 
 
Extract 3 
“If the hearts and minds in the right place they would be able to help you but 
they just don’t care.... because what might be suitable for the Job Centre is 
certainly not suitable for me. But the people there don’t have a clue about 
my access needs or emotionally what I need.”  (Dipesh).  
 
These extracts speak to notions of the reclassification of disabled people in terms of 
‘unemployed labour’ whereby the disabled person’s needs (or barriers) are 
backgrounded against the need to get them back into the labour market. In extract 
4, Liam presents similar evidence of a lack of understanding and an almost forced 
model of equivalence between disabled claimants and unemployed claimants. 
 
Extract 4 
“It was almost like they wasn’t listening. I’ve got my job to do, this is how  
things are, you’re doing it this way or there’s no way. That’s how they were 
with me”. (Liam).  
 
Here we see a report of an example where the individual worth of the person is 
subsumed under a bureaucratic process, in ways which invalidate the participant. 
Across this theme we see a number of ways in which the respondents represent how 
the current system is operating, and how this appears to be detrimental in regards 
to their physical and mental health. Furthermore, these extracts point to feelings of 
failings to understand the impact of disability and mental health and illustrates 
widely held participant views that the current system was flawed, and unfair. This 
brings us to our second theme. 
 
Theme 2: Questions of compliance 
All participants talked about negative experiences of processes of conditionality, 
which were described as a central feature of their relationship with the welfare 
system. 
 
Eight participants spoke about mandatory work-related activity they were required 
to undertake (under threat of sanctioning). They all reported that they felt that this 
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was of no benefit to their employment prospects.  Participants described ways in 
which they felt devalued through their experiences of conditionality, including 
negative interactions with Job Centre staff and having to undertake self-negating 
activities, required under threat of sanction.  Participants also spoke about how 
interactions with Job Centre staff undermined their confidence.  
 
In terms of the issues around sanctioning and fear of sanctioning, participants 
tended to talk much more about the impact that the threat of sanction had upon 




“There’s still the implicit contract, where if they say jump we have to say how 
high..” (Ben).  
 
In extract 6, Hannah describes the sense of constantly being watched and under 
threat. This is indicative of the extent to which  the damaging threat of sanction 
functions to modify and control behaviour, in ways that appear directly detrimental 
to a persons’ physical and mental health. 
 
Extract 6 
“But just the thought of being sanctioned is a worry in itself… How am I going 
to pay for this and that…Sorry I’m getting agitated about it now… am I going 
to have enough money to put on my heating, I’ve got arthritis… If they don’t 
see that you’re doing enough on job searches and that, they can sanction you 
when they feel like it. There’s no ifs or buts, its black and white, this way or 
that’s it. There’s no leniency with anybody. So, if they decide this universal 
match thing, that I ain’t done enough, that’s it, I’m getting sanctioned and 
there’s nothing nobody, I can’t say I was in hospital, I was under anaesthetic, 
they don’t care about that.” (Hannah).  
 
Similarly, in extract 7 Charlie outlines how, the fear of sanction means that the focus 
of the claimant becomes about navigating the Job Centre in order to avoid a 
sanction. Thus, evasion of punishment takes precedence over engagement in 
meaningful activity to look for work.  
 
Extract 7 
“Your whole time, everything you’re doing revolves around the Job Centre 
and what they require from you… So, you’re constantly adapting to them 




Participants described living in a state of permanent anxiety, fearful of losing their 
income through sanctioning. Avoiding a sanction was not something that 
participants felt they could control, they consistently reported this seemed to be at 
the discretion of the Job Centre staff. This had a negative impact on psychological 
well-being and health. For our participants, the experience of living with 
conditionality was very different from the policy stated intent of conditionality as 
providing incentives towards improved health (via employment). These extracts 
indicate how claimants were negatively impacted not only when income was 
removed by sanctioning, but by the experience of living under the threat of sanction 
(regardless of whether they were sanctioned or not). There was no sense in which 
claimants experienced these processes as a positive influence. There was no 
evidence of conditionality as an aid to moving more quickly into employment. In 
fact, there were a number of ways in which participants were negatively impacted by 
conditionality in ways that reduced their employability through lowered self-
confidence and increased anxiety. 
 
When sanctions were applied, their impact upon claimants was often catastrophic. 
In order to demonstrate this, we include a longer narrative. This case incorporates a 
number of the key issues in terms of demonstrating the impact of sanctions on 
participants’ mental and physical health. Sanctions when applied, as they were to 
two of the participants, were devastating to mental health and in the case of Charlie, 
extracts 8 and 9 demonstrate how sanctions seriously impacted his physical health 
and almost led to loss of life.  
 
Extract 8 
“It became a really stressful time for me… we didn’t have a foodbank that 
was open regularly so I didn’t have that as an option… So, what I was doing 
instead, because quite quickly my electricity went out… So, all my food was 
spoilt that was in the freezer.  I managed to last for another 5-6 days of food 
from stuff that I had in the house. So, after that I started to go, I was on a 
work programme but was never called in. So, I’d go in anyway and there 
were oranges and apples in a fruit bowl, so I would just go in there and steal 
the oranges and bananas so I would have something to eat.  Then they finally 
made a decision that I was going to be sanctioned...And there was this image 
which will probably stay with me for the rest of my life. On Christmas day I 
was sat alone, at home just waiting for darkness to come so I could go to 
sleep and I was watching through my window all the happy families enjoying 
Christmas and that just blew me away.  And I think I had a breakdown on that 
day and it was really hard to recover from and I’m still struggling with it.  And 
it was only my aunt, I’ve got an aunt in Scotland, every year she sends me 
£10 for my birthday and £10 for Christmas. And so on the Saturday after 
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Christmas, the first postal day, I received £20 from her and so then I could 
buy some electricity and food.  I was then promptly sick because I’d gorged 
myself, because I ate too quickly.” (Charlie).  
 
Charlie then described meeting with the same advisor who had sanctioned him 
following the Christmas break and how it had affected him since. This further extract 
from Charlie illustrates that sanctions can have an enduring, long term negative 
impact on mental health that far from enabling disabled people to engage in work 
related activity, actually has a significant negative effect that makes vocational 
activity less feasible. 
  
Extract 9 
“So finally, when new-year had ended and I had to go back and sign with that 
same woman who had sanctioned me.  She said that being sanctioned had 
shown her that I didn’t have a work ethic.  Now I’d been working pretty much 
solidly since I was 16 and it was only out of redundancy that I was out of 
work… The problem I had with that was the woman who sanctioned me was 
in the same place and it made me extremely nervous. I now have a problem 
going into the Job Centre because I literally start shaking because of the 
damage that the benefit sanction did to me... So yeah that was part, the 
sanction was one of the reasons that triggered the mental health and 
problems I’m having now… it was awful and I ended up trying to commit 
suicide… to me that was the last straw and I went home and I just emptied 
the drawer of tablets or whatever and I ended up in A&E for a couple of days 
after they’d pumped my stomach out.” (Charlie). 
 
These extracts clearly demonstrate the damaging effects of sanctions on 
participants. In these examples issues of physical and mental health are intertwined 
with processes of sanctioning and this has a myriad number of direct and 
consequential effects in terms of the participants mental and physical health. It is 
also apparent that the threat of sanction operates as a form of psycho-compulsion to 
ensure compliance, and that in many cases, the fear of sanction is sufficient to 
coerce behaviour changes in claimants, and that these coerced behaviour changes 
tend to have a negative impact upon participants’ physical and mental health. 
Furthermore, when sanctions are actually implemented, they had both an 
immediate and enduring negative impact upon the physical and mental health and 
wellbeing of participants. This brings us to our third theme. 
 
Theme 3: Alternative ways of experiencing and responding to this policy regime 
Given the negative impact upon participants’ mental health, the analysis also 
identified positive responses to sanctioning and conditionality. For example, thirteen 
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participants spoke about the importance of peer support or involvement in disability 
campaigning for coping with life under conditionality. Anger towards the welfare 
regime was expressed by half of the participants. Their comments show how, by 
contrast to experiences of conditionality which are characterised by feelings of 
powerlessness under a perverse and punitive system, an attitude of resistance to 
that system provided a way to form connections with others, make sense of the 
world and regain a more positive sense of self. 
 
There was evidence of a sense of connectedness which mediated the isolation and 
meaninglessness that came from living under threat of sanction. It is noteworthy 
how clear lines of equivalence were drawn between people with disabilities who are 
experiencing these policies and processes. Dipesh (extract 10) and Alice (extract 11) 
talk about feelings of solidarity, and Alice invokes this solidarity in the context of a 
very negative example of the impact of sanctioning.  
 
Extract 10 
“It feels nice you see, when I unite with people with disabilities I feel better 
and happy. Being with others always helps. I found talking to like-minded 
people, attending a social group, we help each other” (Dipesh) 
 
Extract 11 
“You don’t want to hear about another person dying because they’ve had 
their benefits cut but at the same time you suffer alongside them as a 
comrade almost, as an equal member of the same bracket in society.” (Alice) 
 
Ben (extract 12) described how campaigning against welfare reform enabled him to 
use his skills in a way that conditional job search activity did not.  This situation is not 
lost on the authors, where Ben deploys a clear set of personal skills (which may 
function positively for him in an employment context) to engage with developing a 
coping strategy for dealing with the benefits system. 
 
Extract 12 
“I’ve done my own research on ESA, so more familiarity than the average 
person would be with the system… I’m still able to use my skills in a way they 
don’t approve of. I suppose that’s important for my identity as well. To be 
able to use the skills I feel are important is important for my self-esteem 
whether the DWP likes it or not.” (Ben). 
 
Eight participants referenced political views concerning welfare reform. Four talked 
about how these views had developed as a result of their negative experiences and 
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how other claimants they know had similarly become politicised by their experiences 
within the current welfare regime.  
Discussion 
 
These findings add further evidence to existing research literature that the 
imposition of activation-based modes of welfare has a detrimental effect on the 
mental health of disabled people (Dwyer et al., 2018; Geiger, 2017; Shefer et al, 
2016; Barr et al, 2015; Kaye, Jordan and Baker, 2012; Garthwaite, 2015; Weston, 
2012). This shift, coupled with concerted efforts to reduce the number of disabled 
people claiming welfare support (by making incapacity benefit and unemployment 
benefit equivalent) means that many of the needs of disabled people are ignored by 
a welfare system which is predicated on transactional models of entitlement rather 
than rights-based systems of support (Grover and Piggott, 2015). These changes, 
alongside models of conditionality and behavioural compliance have had a very clear 
negative impact on the mental health of disabled people.  
 
Rather than providing incentives that can encourage disabled people back into work, 
as per the stated policy goal (DWP and DoH, 2016), our research illustrates the ways 
in which participants experienced these ‘incentives’ as perverse and punitive. 
Moreover, the imposition of incentives led to a state of constant anxiety for many 
and to a full mental health crisis for some. Living under the constant threat of 
sanctions, (sanctions which appeared unpredictable and to be inconsistently applied) 
can be likened to a state of ‘learned helplessness’ (Weiner, 1985) that is associated 
with a number of serious mental health diagnoses including depression and anxiety 
(Seligman, 1975). 
 
This policy of conditionality is predicated against a theoretical and empirical 
background of Behavioural Economics (BIT, 2015; Leicester, Levell and Rasul, 2012; 
Gollwitzer, 1999). Our participants’ reports suggest that these incentives are 
operating as a form of psychological intervention. However, psychological treatment 
interventions in health and social care settings are subject to consent alongside 
ethical and empirical scrutiny. Given the negative impact of sanctions, we feel these 
particular psychological interventions would not pass scrutiny, indeed, they would 
be rejected as ineffective and harmful, if assessed as a psychological treatment. This 
position undercuts any functional argument made about ‘sanctions working overall’ 
and it identifies a pressing need for these policies to be considered in a broader 
public health framework.  
 
What is particularly problematic is the application of psychological theories about 
theory change that have been developed in controlled experimental conditions with 
non-disabled populations. The use of ‘transaction costs’ (Leicester, Levell and Rasul, 
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2102) such as stigma, making applications an ordeal and using the threat of 
withdrawal of benefits to change behaviour is entirely inappropriate with regard to a 
population of people with pre-existing mental health problems, as at least 50 per 
cent of ESA WRAG members are. The reasons for this are manifold but we want to 
draw particular attention to the paradox of applying measures which increase a 
claimant’s anxiety when they already have high levels of anxiety to begin with. The 
chronic anxiety engendered by the conditionality and sanctioning regime is likely to 
be psychologically harmful for most people, for people with pre-existing conditions it 
is potentially catastrophic.  
 
In order for these types of approaches to work, a system of rigorous risk assessment 
and safeguarding practices would have to be implemented to ethically and safely 
expose disabled people to such a risky intervention as the conditionality and 
sanctioning regime in the ESA WRAG process. But if this were implemented, then in 
large part the fear/threat of sanction would largely be removed as unethical. One 
mooted alternative approach to this is for all vocationally oriented support for 
disabled people to be made voluntary and outsourced to organisations expert in the 
field (Pollard, 2018). While we are not explicitly endorsing this approach, we do think 
that a radical policy and practice reform is urgently needed to avoid further harm to 
disabled people.  
 
Strengths and limitations of the study: 
There are three areas in which this research has made a distinctive contribution. The 
first is that it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first UK welfare reform research 
project that has been entirely co-produced in collaboration between a DPULO and 
academic researchers. This was particularly important at the stage of dissemination 
as it meant that the DPULO was able to act strategically to maximise research impact 
in non-academic forums, including a research launch at the House of Lords hosted by 
a disabled peer, disseminating the findings directly to the DWP’s scientific 
committee, and submitting our findings to a number of relevant Parliamentary 
inquiries in writing and through oral evidence gathering. The findings have also been 
disseminated across disability and claimant activist networks which means they can 
be used to support and inform wider policy and campaigns work that is seeking to 
influence positive change in the current system. . In this study disabled people, 
activists and academics collaborated in order to avoid the research trap of academic 
dissemination that can be subsequently ignored at a policy level (Walker, Speed and 
Taggart, 2018).  
 
The second distinctive contribution is that the research focused specifically on the 
psychological impact of conditionality and sanctioning on disabled people. This is 
particularly appropriate given that much of the theoretical underpinning of the 
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DWP’s use of incentives is based on psychological theory and requires psychological 
as well as behavioural compliance. In this paper the participants clearly demonstrate 
that the use of conditionality and sanctioning is failing to encourage work related 
behaviour even on its own terms. On the basis of these findings we can say that it is 
psychologically ineffective in encouraging positive behaviour change and instead 
creates conditions of chronic anxiety for claimants by creating perverse and punitive 
incentives. Our findings endorse Friedli and Stearn’s (2015) depiction of psycho-
compulsion as a more accurate descriptor of how incentives are actually experienced 
by these disabled claimants.  
 
Finally this research has highlighted that alongside the damaging impacts of a 
punitive welfare environment, there is evidence that disabled people are becoming 
politicised by the process and this is enabling many to find meaning and connections 
with others through resistance in many forms. This finding resists the 
characterisation of disabled people in the welfare system as passive recipients of 
oppressive policies (Beresford, 2016) and reinforces the need for more spaces in 
which this resistance can be articulated and new relationships formed (Taggart, 
2018).  
 
A core limitation of the research is that the sample size is small and sampling issues 
mean that there may have been a tendency for people with more negative 
experiences of the WRAG to come forward. However these issues are mediated by 
the study generating similar findings to other research in the field, particularly the 
Welcond study which was much larger in scale (Dwyer et al., 2018).  
 
Implications:  
Looking to the future, these findings raise a number of concerns regarding the 
proposed expansion of transactional modes of welfare with processes of 
conditionality and sanctioning. Given that the shift towards more forms of 
transactional welfare is an international policy issue (Stafford et al., 2019), not 
confined to the UK, there are important lessons to be learned from this analysis by 
the disability movement in an international context. In the UK, the most recent 
House of Commons Research Briefing Paper (Kennedy and Keen, 2018) emphasises 
the government’s plans to entrench conditionality and sanctioning at the heart of 
Universal Credit, leading to its imposition on all citizens, in work or out, who claim 
any form of welfare benefit. Current government estimates suggest 7 million families 
will receive Universal Credit across the UK (Kennedy and Keen, 2018). The current 
position states;  
“The financial support provided by Universal Credit is underpinned by 
a new ‘conditionality’ framework setting out the responsibilities 
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claimants may be required to meet. The level of requirements will 
depend on the claimants’ circumstances. The conditionality framework 
is backed up by a ‘strong and clear’ sanctions regime for non- 
compliance” (p.6).  
As our research demonstrates, the strong and clear message that our participants 
heard was concerned with the threat of sanctioning. The mainstreaming of 
conditionality described here means that ‘strong’ may be taken to mean punitive. 
What is clear is that the body of evidence (Hale, 2014; Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Barr 
et al. 2015; Geiger, 2017; Dwyer et al., 2018; Taggart, 2018) pointing to the negative 
impact of conditionality and sanctions has been largely ignored at the level of policy. 
On the basis of this study, this poses the real risk of a public mental health crisis 
ensuing as a result of the imposition of perverse and punitive incentives in a coercive 
conditionality context. This has international implications as more governments 
pursue transactional modes of welfare. With this in mind, we conclude by pointing 
to the collaborative methodology employed by this study, and to suggest that future 
work needs to build on the partnership of researchers and DPULO as bottom up 
activism and campaigning is needed as an important adjunct to conventional 
research.   




Barr, B., Taylor-Robinson, D., Stuckler, D., Loopstra, R., Reeves, A. and 
Whitehead, M. 2015.  ”First, do no harm: are disability assessments 
associated with adverse trends in mental health? A longitudinal ecological 
study”.  Journal of Epidemiological Community Health, 0, 1-7.   
Behavioural Insights Team. 2015. Update Report 2013-2015. Behavioural 




Beresford, P. 2016. “Presenting welfare reform: poverty porn, telling sad 
stories or achieving change?” Disability & Society. Taylor & Francis, 31 (3), 
421–425. 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. 2006. “Using thematic analysis in psychology”.  
Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3, 77-101.  
Department for Work and Pensions. 2011. “Conditionality, sanctions and 
hardship. Equality impact assessment.” Accessed August 30 2019. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
220160/eia-conditionality-wr2011.pdf  
Department for Work and Pensions. 2012. “Welfare Reform Act.” Accessed 
August 30 2019. 
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/5/contents/enacted 
Department for Work and Pensions and Department for Health. 2017.  
“Improving Lives: The future for work, health and disability.” Accessed August 




Department for Work and Pensions and Department for Health. 2016. “Open 
consultation.  Work, health and disability green paper: improving lives.” 
Accessed August 30 2019.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/work-health-and-disability-
improving-lives/work-health-and-disability-green-paper-improving-
lives#contents   
Department for Work and Pensions. 2018. “Guidance: Universal Credit and 
you.” Accessed August 30 2019.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/universal-credit-and-
you/universal-credit-and-you-a#your-commitment 
Dwyer, P. and Wright, S. 2014 ‘‘Universal credit, ubiquitous conditionality and 
its implications for social citizenship’’.The Journal of Poverty and Social 
Justice. Policy Press, 22 (1), 27. 
20 
 
Dwyer, P., Jones, K., McNeill, J., Scullion, L., and Stewart, A. 2018. “Final 
Findings: Disabled people, Research Briefing for the Welfare Conditionality: 
Sanctions, Support and Behaviour Change project”. University of York. 
Fletcher, D. R. and Wright, S. 2018. ‘‘A hand up or a slap down? Criminalising 
benefit claimants in Britain via strategies of surveillance, sanctions and 
deterrence’’. Critical Social Policy., 38 (2), 323–344. 
Flintoff, A., Speed, E. and McPherson, S. 2018. ‘‘Risk assessment practice 
within primary mental health care: A logics perspective’’, Health. doi: 
10.1177/1363459318769471. 
Friedli, L. 2014. ‘‘The ethics of psycho-policy: Reflections on the role of 
psychology in public health and workfare’’.  Clinical Psychology Forum, 256, 
11–16. 
Friedli, L. and Stearn, R. 2015. ‘‘Positive affect as coercive strategy: 
conditionality, activation and the role of psychology in UK government 
workfare programmes’’. Medical Humanities. 41 (1), 40–47. 
Garthwaite, K. 2011. ‘‘The language of shirkers and scroungers? Talking 
about illness, disability and coalition welfare reform”. Disability & Society, 26 
(3), 369-372. 
Garthwaite, K. 2015. ‘‘Becoming incapacitated? Long-term sickness benefit 
recipients and the construction of stigma and identity narratives’’. Sociology of 
Health & Illness, 37 (1),  1–13. 
Geiger, B. B. 2017. “Benefits conditionality for disabled people: Stylised facts 
from a review of international evidence and practice”.  Journal of Poverty and 
Social Justice, 25 (2), 107-128. 
Geiger, B. B., Garthwaite, K., Warren, J., and Bambra, C.. 2018. ‘‘Assessing 
work disability for social security benefits: international models for the direct 
assessment of work capacity’’, Disability and rehabilitation. 40 (24),  2962–
2970. 
Gollwitzer, P. (1999) Implementation intentions: Storng effects and simple 
plans, The American Psychologist, 54 (7), pp. 493-503. 
Grover, C. 2015. ‘‘Employment and Support Allowance, the ‘summer budget’ 
and less eligible disabled people’’, Disability & Society. 30 (10), 1573–1576. 
Grover, C. 2017. ‘‘Ending reassessment for employment and support 
allowance for some disabled people in the UK’’. Disability & Society. 32 (8), 
1269–1274. doi: 10.1080/09687599.2017.1333565. 
Grover, C. and Piggott, L. 2007. ‘‘Social security, employment and incapacity 
benefit: critical reflections on A New Deal for Welfare’’, Disability & Society. 22 
(7), 733–746. 
Grover, C. and Piggott, L. 2012. ‘‘Economic crisis, need & voluntary 
21 
 
organisations in the Lancaster district: a report for Lancaster District 
Community Voluntary Solutions’’. Available at: lancastercvs. org. uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/economic …. 
Grover, C. and Piggott, L. 2015. Disabled people, work and welfare: Is 
employment really the answer? Policy Press. 
Hale, C. 2014. ‘‘Fulfilling potential’’. ESA and the fate of the Work-Related 
Activity Group. 
Her Majesty’s Treasury. 2015. “Policy paper: Summer budget 2015”. 
Accessed August 30 2019. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/summer-budget-2015/summer-
budget-2015.   
House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee. 2018. “Benefit 
Sanctions: Nineteenth Report of Session 2017-19. HC955”. Accessed August 





Houston, D. and Lindsay, C. 2010 ‘‘Fit for work? Health, employability and 
challenges for the UK welfare reform agenda’’, Policy Studies. 31 (2), 133–
142. doi: 10.1080/01442870903429595. 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 2014.  “Welfare sanctions and conditionality in 
the U.K”. Accessed August 30 2019.         
https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/welfare-sanctions-and-conditionality-uk 
Kaye, A., Jordan, H., and Baker, M. 2012. “The tipping point: The human and 
economic costs of cutting disabled people’s support”. https://thehardesthit. 
files.wordpress.com/2012/10/the_tipping_point_oct_2012.pdf 
Kennedy, S., Murphy, C., and Wilson, W. 2016.  “House of Commons Library 
Briefing Paper: Welfare reform and disabled people, No. 7571”. Accessed 
August 30 2019.   
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-
7571#fullreport 
Kennedy, S., Murphy, C., Keen, R., and Bate, A. 2017. “House of Commons 
Library Briefing Paper: Abolition of ESA Work Related Activity Component, 
No. 7649” London. Accessed August 30 2019. 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7649 
 
Kennedy, S., and Keen, R. 2018. "House of Commons Library Briefing Paper: 
Universal Credit roll-out: 2018-19. No. 8299" London.  
 
Leicester, A., Levell, P., and Rasul, I. 2012. “Institute of Fiscal Studies 
Commentary C125: Tax and Benefit Policy- insights from behavioural 
22 
 
economics”. Accessed August 30 2019.  
https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6268 
 
Marks, A., Cowan, S. and McLean, G. 2017. Mental health and 
unemployment in Scotland: Understanding the impact of welfare reforms in 
Scotland for individuals with mental health conditions. Edinburgh: Heriot Watt 
University and Edinburgh Napier University.  
 
Moffitt, R. 1983. ‘‘An economic model of welfare stigma’’. American Economic 
Review, 73 (5), 1023– 1035.  
National Audit Office (NAO). 2016. “Department for Work and Pensions: 
Benefit Sanctions”. Accessed August 30 2019. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Benefit-sanctions-Summary.pdf 
Pascual, A. S. and Magnusson, L. 2007. Reshaping welfare states and 
activation regimes in Europe. Vol. 54, Peter Lang. 
Patton, M.Q. 1990. Qualitative evaluation and research methods (2nd ed.) 
Newbury park, CA: Sage. 
Pollard, T. 2018. “DEMOS: Pathways from poverty: A case for institutional 
reform”. Accessed August 30 2019.                               
https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Pathways-from-Poverty-a-
case-for-institutional-reform.pdf 
Seligman, M. 1975.Helplessness: On depression, development and death. 
San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. 
 
Shefer, G., Henderson, C., Frost-Gaskin, M., and Pacitti, R. 2016. “Only 
making things worse: a qualitative study of the impact of wrongly removing 
disability benefits from people with mental illness”. Community Mental Health 
Journal, 52 (7), 834-841. 
Speed E, and Taggart, D. 2012. “It’s your problem but you need us to help 
you fix it: the paradox at the heart of the IAPT agenda”. Asylum Magazine for 
Democratic Psychiatry-Special Issue on Anti-Capitalism and Mental Health. 
19 (3), 23–24. 
Stafford, L.,  Marston, G., Beatson, A., MChamorro-Koc, M. and Drennan, J. 
2019. “Interpretative accounts of work capacity assessment policy for young 
adults with disabilities”. Disability & Society, 1-19.  doi: 
10.1080/09687599.2018.1561356  
Taggart, D., (2018). Introduction to special feature on welfare rights: Austerity 
from above, resistance from below. Asylum- Magazine for Democratic 
Psychiatry. 25 (3), 4-5 
 
Thaler, R. H. and Sunstein, C. R. 2009. Nudge: Improving decisions about 
23 
 
health, wealth, and happiness. Penguin. 
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. 1974. “Judgment under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases”. Science, 185 (4157), 1124-1131. 
Van den Berg, G., Uhlendorff, A., and Wolff, J. 2013. “Sanctions for Young 
Welfare Recipients, IZA Discussion Paper No. 7630 IZA- Institute of Labor”. 
https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/7630/sanctions-for-young-welfare-
recipients 
Wacquant, L.2009. Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social 
Insecurity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
Walker, C., Speed, E. and Taggart, D. 2018. ‘‘Turning psychology into policy: 
a case of square pegs and round holes?’’ Palgrave Communications, 4 (108). 
Weiner, B. 1985. “An attributional theory of achievement motivation and 
emotion”. Psychological Review, 92 (4), 548-573. 
Weston, K. 2012. “Debating conditionality for disability benefits recipients and 
welfare reform: Research evidence from Pathways to Work”. Local Economy, 
27 (5-6), 514-528. 
Wright, S. 2016. “Conceptualising the active welfare subject: welfare reform in 
discourse, policy and lived experience”. Policy and Politics, 44 (2), 235-252.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
